






























































historic	 interests	 in	 how	humans	 choose.	More	 recently,	 JDM	has	diversified	 into	 streams	54	
influenced	 by	 different	 disciplines	 such	 as	 psychology,	 economy	 and	 neuroscience.	 These	55	
developments	 such	as	 risk	decisions	have	been	highlighted	by	a	Noble	Price	 for	economic	56	
sciences	awarded	to	the	psychologist	Daniel	Kahneman	in	2002,	and	have	led	to	an	intense	57	












each	 in	 one	 of	 these	 main	 streams	 we	 cluster	 as	 economic	 (Bar-Eli),	 social	 judgment	70	













he	 acts,	 bound	 the	 decisions	 to	 make	 them	 “good	 enough”	 or	 “satisfying”,	 rather	 than	81	
optimal	 allowing	 for	 fast	 and	 frugal	 choices.	 In	 what	 followed,	 psychology	 could	 then	 be	82	
“mobilized”	 to	 account	 for	 this	 gap	 between	 the	 economic/ideal	 and	 behavioural/real	83	
models	of	rationality.	84	
					In	 the	 early	 1970’s,	 Israeli	 psychologists	 Amos	 Tversky	 and	 Daniel	 Kahneman	 began	 to	85	
study	 human	 cognition	 using	 what	 was	 later	 labeled	 the	 “heuristics	 and	 biases	 (H&B)”	86	
paradigm	(Gilovich,	Griffin	&	Kahneman,	2002;	Kahneman,	Slovic	&	Tversky,	1982).	In	short,	87	
their	major	 idea	was	 that	human	beings	use	some	very	 fast	and	simple	modes	of	 intuitive	88	
thinking	(heuristics)	when	taking	risk	or	making	judgments	and	decisions	under	conditions	of	89	
uncertainty.	 For	 the	majority	 of	 people	 and	 situation,	 the	 use	 of	 these	 heuristics	 leads	 to	90	
satisfactory	 outcomes,	 even	 if	 this	 suboptimal	 processing	 of	 information	 does	 not	 end	 up	91	
with	the	best	result.	In	fact,	quite	often,	human	JDM	is	then	biased	in	comparison	to	some	92	
“rational”	 (e.g.,	 economic)	 benchmark.	 According	 to	 Tversky	 and	 Kahneman,	we	 “pay	 the	93	
price”	 for	 simplifying	 and	 facilitating	 our	 JDM	 processes	 by	 getting	 “biased”	 under	 risky	94	
and/or	(un)certain	circumstances,	thereby	“undoing”	several	rules	of	“economic”	rationality	95	
(Lewis,	 2016).	 Later	on,	 this	 approach	was	extended	 into	 “prospect	 theory”	 (Kahneman	&	96	







study	 of	 JDM	 had	 substantially	 lagged	 behind	 its	 potential	 until	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 first	101	
decade	of	the	2000s.	This	was	quite	surprising	because,	for	example,	already	in	1985,	one	of	102	
the	most	provocative	 investigations	 in	 the	history	of	 JDM	was	published,	namely	Gilovich,	103	
Vallone	and	Tversky’s	(1985)	study	on	the	(absence	of)	“hot	hand”	in	basketball.	Gilovich	et	104	
al.	 (1985)	 found	 that	 players	 who	 hit	 two	 or	 three	 times	 in	 a	 row	 compared	 to	 previous	105	
situations	in	which	they	miss	two	or	three	shots	have	an	equal	probability	to	hit	again	and	106	
thus	are	not	'hot'.	This	was	provocative	or	at	least	contra-intuitive	for	sport	fans,	based	on	107	
their	 beliefs	 and	 experiences.	 Despite	 the	 great	 deal	 of	 research	 inspired	 by	 this	 study	 in	108	
other	areas	(e.g.,	cognitive	psychology),	it	was	generally	disregarded	by	sport	psychology,	as	109	
were	 other	 aspects	 of	 JDM,	 which	 had	 –	 as	 it	 turned	 out	 later	 -	 a	 huge	 theoretical	 and	110	
practical	potential	for	advancing	this	discipline.	111	
Introducing	 JDM	 to	 sport.	 Upon	 the	 establishment	 of	 “Psychology	 of	 Sport	 and	 Exercise”	112	
(PSE)	in	2000,	its	Founding	Editor,	Stuart	Biddle	encouraged	the	publication	of	special	issues	113	
intended	 to	 strengthen	 the	 newborn	 journal.	 One	 outcome	 was	 a	 special	 issue	 on	 JDM	114	
initiated	by	Michael	 Bar-Eli,	who	was	 at	 that	 time	Associate	 Editor	 of	 PSE.	 Co-edited	with	115	




Bar-Eli	 and	 Raab	 (2009a)	 and	 Bar-Eli	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 developed	 a	 taxonomy	 of	 theories	 and	120	




probabilistic,	 that	 is,	 more	 realistic.	 In	 addition,	 Bar-Eli	 and	 Raab	 (2009a)	 noted	 a	 trend	122	
toward	integrating	a	number	of	different	description	levels	(i.e.,	behavioural,	computational	123	
and	 neurophysiological)	 in	 theorizing	 and	modeling	 which	 were	 then	 prevalent.	 Finally,	 a	124	
number	of	theory-led	applications	of	knowledge	in	the	sport	area	were	observed	(Bar-Eli	et	125	
al.,	2011).		126	
				Despite	 these	 positive	 developments,	 Bar-Eli	 and	 Raab	 (2009a)	 and	 Bar-Eli	 et	 al.	 (2011)	127	
were	still	concerned	about	the	broader	theories	of	cognition	and	action	being	adopted	and	128	
applied	far	too	slowly	by	researchers	in	sports.	The	delay	of	5	to	10	years	(see	Bar-Eli	et	al.,	129	
2011,Fig.	3.2)	between	the	original	publication	of	a	particular	 theory	 in	 the	social	 sciences	130	
and	 its	 subsequent	 application	 in	 sports	 were	 considered	 unfortunate,	 but	 nonetheless	131	
inevitable	 due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 sports	 involving	 both	 cognition	 and	 action	 .	 Thus,	 JDM	132	
research	may	 come	 to	 play	 a	more	 important	 role	 in	 better	 understanding	 not	 only	 how	133	
people	 make	 judgments	 and	 decisions,	 but	 also	 how	 they	 are	 expressed	 through	134	
movements.	135	
The	present:	An	economic,	social	judgment,	ecological	and	cognitive	approach	136	
In	 2018	 using	 Web	 of	 Science	 and	 search	 for	 the	 American	 and	 British	 spelling	 of	137	
Judg(e)ment	or	Decision	Making	and	Sport	we	compiled	a	 list	of	168	papers	matching	 the	138	
content.	One	of	the	authors	(MR)	and	a	research	assistant	in	JDM	research	(SE)	read	title	and	139	
abstract	 and	 included	 the	 paper	 if	 the	 content	 refers	 to	 judgment	 and	 decision	 making	140	
processes	 of	 individual	 persons	 as	 defined	 above.	 The	 path	 analyses	 was	 given	 to	 the	141	
remaining	authors	of	 the	manuscript	 (ME,	HP,	DA)	 for	 accept	or	 reject	 relations	based	on	142	
their	expertise	in	the	specific	subarea	of	JDM	research.	Figure	1	aims	at	summarizing	these	143	
publications	 into	 a	 citation-network	 description.	 Papers	 that	 influence	 the	 recent	 work	144	





developed	 independent	 theoretical	 streams	 of	 economic,	 social	 judgment,	 ecological	 and	147	
cognitive	approaches.	As	Figure	1	 indicates	 the	overlap	and	historical	 trace	between	some	148	
approaches	are	differently	strong.	149	
An	economic	approach	to	judgment	and	decision	making	in	sports	150	
The	 hot	 hand	 example.	 Among	 the	 approaches	 considered	 by	 Bar-Eli	 and	 Raab	 (2006a,	151	
2006b,	 2009a,	 see	 also	 Bar-Eli	 et	 al,	 2011)	 to	 be	 more	 appropriate	 for	 sports	 settings,	152	
“decision	field	theory”	(DFT;	see	Busemeyer	and	Townsend,	1993)	and	Gigerenzer’s	 (2000)	153	
“simple/fast	 and	 frugal	 heuristics	 (FFH)”	 were	 included.	 However,	 the	 most	 substantial	154	
development	 in	 this	 respect	 occurred	 when	 the	 scientific	 community,	 slowly	 but	 surely,	155	
acknowledged,	 that	 “sports	 research	 is	 a	 great	 idea,	 because	 people	 here	 take	 many	156	
decisions	that	are	of	great	importance	to	them	under	standard	conditions.	In	fact,	this	is	one	157	
of	 the	best	 fields	 to	do	 that”	 (Kahneman,	 2008).	 In	other	words,	 research	 relying	on	data	158	
from	sports	has	been	gradually	conducted	not	only	for	the	sake	of	understanding	sports,	but	159	
rather,	 for	 being	 used	 as	 a	 laboratory	 for	 assessment	 of	 important	 psychological	 and/or	160	
economic	theories.	Evidently,	Gilovich	et	al.’s	(1985)	study	was	a	showcase	of	such	research,	161	
with	 over	 1300	 citations	 on	 Google	 Scholar	 thus	 far	 –	 but	 being	 almost	 completely	162	
disregarded	by	sport-psychology	from	1985	to	2006!		163	
					As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	 the	 hot-hand	 debate	 was	 one	 of	 the	most	 inspiring	 controversies	164	
between	 the	 H&B	 and	 FFH	 approaches	 (Lewis,	 2016).	 The	 first	 literature	 review	 ever	165	
conducted	 on	 this	 issue	 (Bar-Eli,	 Avugos	 &	 Raab,	 2006b)	 found	 no	 solid	 evidence	 for	 the	166	
existence	 of	 a	 “hot	 hand”	 –	 a	 finding	 further	 validated	 by	 a	 more	 recent	 meta-analysis	167	
(Avugos,	 Koeppen,	 Csienskowski,	 Raab	 &	 Bar-Eli,	 2013a).	 These	 results	 turned	 also	 to	 be	168	




widely	 accepted	 self-efficacy	 theory.	 For	 this	 theory	 “success	 breeds	 success	 and	 failure	170	





			In	 response	 to	 these	 accumulating	 H&B-oriented	 findings,	 FFH-researchers	 argued	 that	176	
even	 if	 the	evidence	for	a	“hot	hand”	 in	sports	was	“controversial”	 (e.g.,	Bennis	&	Pachur,	177	




though	 defenders	 behaved	 according	 to	 the	 “hot	 hand”	 belief	 (e.g.	 defended	 the	 hot	182	
attacker	closer	or	with	two	players),	no	evidence	in	favor	of	a	real	“hot	hand”-	effect	could	183	
be	 found.	Csapo	 (2015)	even	observed	 that	a	“hot	hand”-behaviour	on	defense	 in	 specific	184	
cases	 could	 not	 be	 considered	 adaptive.	 At	 any	 rate,	 the	 ongoing	 debate	 around	 this	185	




is	 the	 penalty	 kick	 in	 soccer.	 In	 his	 fascinating	 book	 entitled	 “Beautiful	 game	 theory”,	190	
economist	 Ignacio	Palacios-Huerta	 (2014)	demonstrated	“how	soccer	 can	help	economics”	191	
(not	the	opposite),	among	others,	by	intensively	investigating	penalty	kicks.	Palacios-Huerta	192	





past,	 they	 had	 been	 examined	 empirically	 in	 laboratory	 experiments	 with	 low	 external	195	
validity,	as	opposed	to	 real	data	 from	soccer	matches	 (Azar	&	Bar-Eli,	2011).	The	 fact	 that	196	
penalties	 are	 often	 taken	 as	 a	 series	 of	 shootouts	 in	 a	 constant	 situation	 and	 with	 large	197	
incentives,	 made	 them	 attractive	 for	 researchers	 who	 were	 interested	 in	 the	 study	 of	198	
approach	motivation	(Roskes,	Sligte,	Shalvi,	&	De	Dreu,	2011),	gambler’s	fallacy	(Misirlisoy	&	199	




is	 to	 stay	 in	 the	 goal’s	 center,	 goalkeepers	 almost	 always	 jump	 to	 the	 left	 or	 right.	 The	204	
authors	explained	 this	non-optimal	behaviour	by	norm	theory	 (Kahneman	&	Miller,	1986).	205	
The	goalkeepers’	norm	 is	 to	act	 (jumping),	 and	a	goal	 scored	yields	worse	 feelings	 for	 the	206	
goalkeeper	 following	 inaction	 (staying	 in	 the	 center)	 than	 following	 action	 (jumping),	 thus	207	
leading	to	a	bias	for	action.	However,	Bar-Eli,	Azar	and	Lurie	(2009b)	noted	that	goalkeepers’	208	
behaviour	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 biased	 (towards	 action)	 only	 if	 we	 assume	 –	 in	 line	 with	209	
traditional	 economic	 theory	 (e.g.,	 SEU;	 see	 Edwards,	 1954)	 –	 that	 their	 utility	 function	210	
reflects	the	strategy	of	maximizing	the	chances	of	stopping	the	ball.	211	
				Bar-Eli	 and	 Azar	 (2009c)	 used	 the	 set	 of	 penalty	 kicks	 included	 in	 Bar-Eli	 et	 al.’s	 (2007)	212	
study	 to	 investigate	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 kickers.	 It	 was	 found	 that	 whereas	 the	 optimal	213	
shooting	strategy,	which	maximizes	 the	chances	of	scoring,	 is	 to	aim	the	ball	 to	 the	upper	214	
third	 of	 the	 goal	 -	 in	 particular	 to	 the	 upper	 two	 corners	 -	 kickers	 rarely	 shoot	 to	 this	215	














assumed	 by	 the	 investigators,	 then	 they	 are	 rational.	 More	 specifically,	 in	 terms	 of	227	
Gigerenzer’s	 (2000)	 concept	 of	 “social	 rationality”,	 they	 seem	 to	 be	 very	 rational:	 in	 an	228	
environment	where	the	“base	rate”	(i.e.,	probability	of	scoring)	is	about	75	-	80%	(Palacios-229	
Huerta,	2014),	a	goalkeeper	wants	to	look	good,	doing	his	best	to	stop	the	ball	by	jumping	in	230	
a	 situation	 in	 which	 he	 is	 clearly	 the	 “underdog”.	 Similarly,	 the	 shooter	 wants	 to	 avoid	231	
“looking	bad”	 in	a	situation	where	he/she	is	a	clear	“favorite”.	Thus,	from	a	social	point	of	232	
view,	 both	 are	 very	 rational	 in	 terms	 of	 self-presentational	 considerations	 (Bar-Eli	 et	 al.,	233	





















































































































































































to	 pass	 or	 to	 shoot	 to	 the	 basket	would	 separate	 different	 constructs	 and	processes	 (e.g.	394	
cue-use	 in	 perception/recognition	 or	 recall	 in	 memory)	 that	 could	 influence	 the	 choice.	395	
Dependent	on	 the	 specific	 cognitive	 approach	a	 specific	 theory	drives	 the	description	and	396	
potential	modelling	 of	 behaviour,	 (e.g.	 see	 the	 application	 of	 the	Decision-Field-Theory	 to	397	
sports,	 Johnson,	 2006).	 Due	 to	 the	 expertise	 of	 one	 of	 the	 authors	 we	 will	 focus	 on	 the	398	
simple	 heuristic	 approach.	 A	 simple	 heuristic	 is	 a	 rule	 of	 thumb	 that	 consists	 of	 building	399	
blocks	called	search,	stop	and	decision	rules.		400	
An	 example:	 	 A	 playmaker	 behaving	 according	 to	 the	 Take-The-First	 heuristic	 (Johnson	&	401	
Raab,	 2003)	 would	 search	 for	 the	 most	 valid	 option	 on	 the	 field,	 stops	 searching	 after	402	
generating	 two	 or	 three	 further	 options	 and	 chooses	 the	 first	 option.	 A	 Take-The-Best	403	











The	above	examples	are	prototypical	 for	 the	previous	 summaries	of	applications	 to	 sports	412	
(Bennis	&	 Pachur,	 2006;	 Raab,	 2012).	 Further	 examples	 include	 applications	 for	 heuristics	413	
that	 are	 tuned	 to	 fast	 choices	 of	 allocation	 decisions	 in	 team-sports	 (e.g.	 Hepler	 &	 Feltz,	414	
2012),	or	motor	control	related	processes	(e.g.	Raab,	Masters,	&	Maxwell,	2005).	In	addition,	415	
heuristics	have	been	applied	to	betting	behaviour	of	spectators	 (Serwe	&	Frings,	2006),	or	416	
coaches'	 decisions	 in	 talent	 selection	 and	 development	 (De	 Oliveira,	 Lobinger,	 &	 Raab,	417	
2014).	Finally,	recent	theoretical	comparisons	have	been	put	forward	which	include	a	table	418	
of	 elements	 of	 building	 blocks	 and	 heuristics	 relevant	 for	 different	 applications	 in	 sport	419	
psychology	(Raab,	2018).		420	
Methodologically,	cognitive	approaches	to	judgment	and	decision	making	in	sports	are	often	421	
quite	 experimentally-oriented.	 Experimental	 approaches	 use	 paradigms	 that	 differentiate	422	
cues	from	fixed	sets	of	options	or	ask	participants	to	generate	options	for	a	given	situation	423	
(e.g.	 Belling,	 Suss	 &	 Ward,	 2015).	 Time	 pressure	 is	 one	 of	 the	 situational	 variables	424	




In	 summary,	 the	 cognitive	 approach	 set	 standards	 to	 formulate	 the	 probabilities	 and	429	







As	 many	 other	 areas	 in	 sport	 psychology,	 JDM	 sport	 research	 began	 from	 the	 need	 to	434	
understand	sport	phenomena.	For	this	purpose,	 imported	theories	were	adopted,	adapted			435	








another	type	of	 (bounded)	rationality	–	 in	this	case,	social.	 It	 is	our	 firm	conviction	that	as	444	
long	 as	 sport	 will	 be	 increasingly	 viewed	 as	 one	 of	 the	 best	 fields	 to	 study	 human	 JDM	445	
processes	(as	noted	by	Kahneman,	2008),	research	in	this	area	will	continue	to	flourish.	446	
Social	cognition	theoretical	challenges	447	
The	 application	 of	 the	 social	 cognition	 approach	 in	 the	 field	 of	 sport	 aims	 at	 promoting	448	
progress	 in	 corresponding	 fields,	 such	 as	 officiating	 (MacMahon	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 sport	449	
performance	 evaluation	 (Fasold,	 Memmert	 &	 Unkelbach,	 2015),	 and	 person	 (athlete)	450	
perception	(Greenlees,	2007).	As	has	been	described	above,	in	order	to	do	so	research	needs	451	
to	 overcome	 the	 stage	 of	 capturing	 effects	 and	must	 follow	 the	 road	 to	 explanation	 and	452	
theory	 based	 interventions.	 Therefore,	 the	 most	 urgent	 challenge	 is	 the	453	
development/shaping	of	theories	that	are	concerned	with	specific	 judgment	tasks	 in	sport.	454	
For	example,	some	efforts	have	already	been	made	 in	this	regard	concerning	refereeing	 in	455	








may	 lead	 to	 the	 high	 number	 of	 erroneous	 offside	 decisions	 in	 association	 football	 (cf.	461	
Brand,	Plessner,	&	Unkelbach,	2008).		462	
Ecological	theoretical	challenges	463	
Recently	Withagen,	 Araújo	 and	 de	 Poel	 (2017)	 sketched	 a	 dynamical	model	 of	 the	 agent-464	
environment	 relationship	where	agency	 is	 conceptualized	as	 the	 capacity	 to	modulate	 the	465	
coupling	strength	with	the	environment.	This	model	explained	that	the	agent	can	influence	466	
to	some	extent	how	he	or	she	is	influenced	by	the	different	affordances.	By	modulating	the	467	
coupling	 strength,	 the	 agent	 simply	 alters	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 performer-environment	468	
system	and	thus	the	behaviour	that	emerges.	This	model	opens	to	ecological	dynamics	the	469	
challenge	 of	 understanding	 how	 changes	 in	 individual	 variables	 modulate	 the	 coupling	470	
strength	 with	 the	 environment.	 Following	 the	 same	 logic,	 it	 opens	 the	 possibility	 to	471	
understand	 how	 environment’s	 changes	 (e.g.,	 social,	 task-related,	 technology-based)	472	
constraints	the	coupling	strength	with	the	performer.	A	third	challenge	is	to	understand	how	473	
these	modulations	make	 the	performer-environment	 system	more	 robust	and	 flexible	 (i.e.	474	
antifragile,	a	system	that	is	leveraged	by	adversity;	Kiefer,	Silva,	Harrison,	&	Araújo,	in	press)	475	
over	 time.	 The	 coupling	 strength	 can	 be	 captured	 by	 eco-physical	 variables,	 as	 we	476	
mentioned	 in	 the	 tennis	 example,	 where	 constraints	 such	 as	 court	 type,	 adversary	 level,	477	







cue-validities?	 How	 do	 we	 become	 experts	 in	 decision-making?	 In	 sports,	 proposals	 on	482	
decision	 training	 (e.g.	 Vickers,	 2007)	 have	 been	 contrasted	 with	 Teaching	 Games	 For	483	
Understanding	(Griffin,	Mitchell	&	Oslin,	1997),	Ball	schools	(Memmert	&	Roth,	2007)	or	the	484	
SMART-ER	model	 (Raab,	 2015),	 but	 those	 learning	 proposals	 in	 sports	 have	 not	 yet	 been	485	
related	to	learning	approaches	within	the	specific	frameworks	such	as	simple	heuristics	(e.g.	486	
Rieskamp	&	Otto,	2006).	487	
A	 further	 challenge	 of	 the	 cognitive	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 leaves	 us	 in	 the	 dark	 about	 the	488	
answer	 of	 which	 model	 and	 theoretical	 approach	 is	 valid	 and	 would	 predict	 different	489	
behaviour.	 For	 instance,	 for	 specific	 models	 Take-The-First	 heuristic	 assumes	 a	 negative	490	
correlation	 between	 number	 of	 generated	 options	 and	 choice	 quality	 whereas	 the	 Long-491	
Term-Working-Memory	model	 (Ericsson	 &	 Lehmann,	 1996)	 predicts	 a	 positive	 correlation	492	
that	can	be	put	to	the	test.		493	
Conclusion	494	
Hopefully,	the	future	will	bring	more	research	of	the	kind	“Theory	A	of	JDM	Phenomenon	X”	495	
versus	“Theory	B	of	Phenomenon	X”	or	“Theory	A”	versus	“Theory	of	B”	in	explaining	496	
multiple	phenomena	X,	Y	and	Z.	Consequently,	this	would	not	only	drive	the	theoretical	497	
progress	in	the	field	but	pave	the	road	to	better	JDM	in	sport.	Likewise,	questions	of	498	
athletes,	coaches,	managers	and	fans	not	often	are	well-studied	yet	and	could	inform	how	499	
we	should	proceed	in	the	next	50	years	of	JDM	research.	The	list	of	those	phenomena	is	500	
longer	than	a	single	researcher’s	life	and	list	of	potential	studies	can	easily	pursue,	as	choice	501	
is	almost	everywhere	in	sports.	Thus,	the	future	of	JDM	research	may	lie	in	JDM	teams.			502	
	503	
	504	
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